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171 
THE REALITY PRINCIPLE 
Lawrence G. Sager* and Nelson Tebbe** 
INTRODUCTION 
Many liberals have received the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission1 
as narrow and regrettable.2 On this view, Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy sought to escape a conflict between two of his 
paramount commitments, to religious freedom and to equal 
citizenship for LGBTQ people, by writing a majority opinion that 
was specific to the peculiar facts in Colorado and therefore limited 
in its precedential effect. But this reading overlooks aspects of the 
Court’s ruling that may well be consequential. Some of these are 
salutary, while others are more troubling. 
On the one hand, Masterpiece established several broad 
principles that can work to promote full and equal citizenship for 
all Americans in future cases. Now is the moment to underscore 
these aspects of the decision, because additional cases pitting 
religious freedom against equality law are percolating in lower 
courts. In fact, Masterpiece Cakeshop itself is already back in 
litigation after it turned away a customer who requested a cake to 
celebrate a gender transition.3 Before long, a Court without 
 
 * Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair, University of Texas School of Law. 
 ** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty 
Fellow, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University. Warm thanks for 
comments on previous drafts to Dale Carpenter, Leslie Kendrick, Christopher Lund, 
Melissa Murray, Douglas NeJaime, Richard Schragger, and Micah Schwartzman. The 
authors joined an amicus brief in the principal case discussed here. Brief of Church-State 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 6988022. 
 1. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 2. See, e.g., David Cole, This Takes the Cake, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 19, 2018, at 24 
(describing the case as decided on a “case-specific ground” and arguing that the Court’s 
finding of antireligious bias was “strained, to put it mildly”). 
 3. See infra note 59 (discussing Verified Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. 
Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 14, 2018)); see also, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, 
Inc. v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (granting cert., vacating the judgment, 
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Justice Kennedy will face such critical questions again, and under 
social circumstances that will be equally or even more intense. By 
the time it does, the salutary lessons of Masterpiece must have 
been learned. 
On the other hand, there is an interpretation of the majority 
opinion that should be strenuously resisted. Several passages of 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion could be read to suggest that the basic 
structure of Colorado’s civil rights law, as enforced by state 
officials and judges, was unconstitutionally hostile to religion. 
That proposition is both wrong and dangerous, but it is already 
being promoted by scholars and activists in the aftermath of the 
decision, including in the new Masterpiece litigation.4 
In this Article, we address both the promising and the 
problematic aspects of the opinion. In Part I, we identify three 
constitutional principles that were established or reaffirmed in 
Masterpiece: that there is no constitutional right to religious 
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations laws; that the government’s interest in avoiding 
dignitary harm is sufficient to defeat most claims for religious 
exemptions; and that courts should be sensitive to evidence of 
government animus against vulnerable groups. In the course of 
that analysis, we emphasize the Court’s recognition that for these 
purposes sexual orientation discrimination and racial 
discrimination are structurally parallel. 
In Part II, we turn to the mistaken interpretation of the 
Court’s opinion that worries us. At points, Kennedy’s language 
has been read to suggest that Colorado’s civil rights practices 
violate the state’s obligation of neutrality toward religion. 
Colorado’s law protects gay couples and religious believers alike 
from discrimination in the marketplace, of course. And the state 
allows any baker—including religious objectors to gay marriage—
to refuse to write messages with which they disagree on their 
cakes, including messages that affirm marriage equality. Yet some 
are arguing that these commonplace civil rights practices are 
somehow biased against religion. If Justice Kennedy really did 
mean to imply that Colorado’s administration of 
 
and remanding for further consideration in light of Masterpiece); Brush & Nib Studio, LC 
v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d. 426 (Ariz. Ct. App.  2018) (ruling against a wedding vendor 
who had religious objections to serving a same-sex couple). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 41–46 (citing scholars); see also infra note 59 
(describing the recent Masterpiece complaint). 
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antidiscrimination law contains a constitutional flaw, then he was 
deeply mistaken, and mistaken in a way that poses serious danger 
for the protection of equal rights in the United States. We explain 
why, drawing on an analysis provided by Charles Black during the 
civil rights era.5 
Black thought that critics of Brown v. Board of Education6 
had ignored the unduckable social import of racial segregation. 
Applying a “reality principle,” Black made legally relevant the 
social fact that segregation worked to perpetuate white 
supremacy. We argue that similar attention to the social structure 
of antidiscrimination laws excludes the errant interpretation of 
Masterpiece. Colorado’s enforcement of its public 
accommodations law rightly protected groups that were subject to 
structural injustice, including both religious denominations 
themselves and the LGBTQ community, and its actions should 
not signal any hostility toward religion. 
Today, many religious conservatives feel beleaguered—they 
see themselves as the subjects of an overweening and 
overconfident liberal orthodoxy that seeks to stamp out their way 
of life. They contend that liberalism has become illiberal; that it 
enforces a cruel and ironic form of conformity. We deeply respect 
the sincerity and importance of religious convictions to many. 
Moreover, we understand that some religious faiths have been 
subject to systematic discrimination. Not only our scholarship, but 
our personal experience testifies to that truth. 
Civil rights law in Colorado—and in every other jurisdiction 
of which we are aware—protects religious believers against 
discrimination based on their beliefs. What it does not do is give 
religiously-motivated persons a blanket exemption from public 
accomodations laws to which they object. The central aim of civil 
rights law is to protect members of vulnerable groups from the 
harms of structural injustice; that vital project would be 
undermined by a broad carve out for religious dissent. 
Antidiscrimination law does not take sides in a purported culture 
war, nor does it violate the liberal and democratic commitment to 
government neutrality among comprehensive conceptions. To the 
contrary, it stipulates what citizens who are divided on questions 
 
 5. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421 (1960). 
 6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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of profound importance nonetheless owe to each other in order 
to live together as equals in our political community. 
I. 
The Masterpiece Court embraced three broad themes that 
provide guidance for the resolution of future conflicts between 
religious freedom and antidiscrimination law, not only in pending 
cases concerning wedding vendors but across constitutional 
doctrine. 
First, the Court reaffirmed that religious actors are not 
constitutionally entitled to exemptions from public 
accommodations laws under normal circumstances. These laws, 
which protect members of vulnerable groups against 
discrimination by those who choose to provide goods and services 
to the public, are too important to equal citizenship to allow for 
exemptions based on conscience. Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion treated this doctrine as constitutional bedrock: “it is a 
general rule that [religious and philosophical] objections do not 
allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in 
society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and 
services under a neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations law.”7  
Including the votes of the two dissenters, who expressly 
embraced this part the Court’s opinion,8 all nine justices thus 
endorsed the application of the rule of Employment Division v. 
Smith to typical public accommodations laws.9 This matters 
because prominent scholars and lawyers had argued during the 
litigation that the Court should abandon the rule of Smith at least 
with respect to Colorado’s enforcement of its public 
accommodations law and perhaps more generally.10 We will 
 
 7. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, , 
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
 8. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Writing separately, Justice Gorsuch later went on to 
characterize Smith as “controversial in many Quarters.” Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 10. Brief of Christian Legal Society, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005662, at *34 (“Colorado has protected the 
consciences of one set of bakers, and refused to protect the consciences of another set of 
bakers, who are squarely on opposite sides of the same divisive question. If the Court is 
open to the possibility that such a law can be rationalized as neutral and generally 
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address the neutrality of the Colorado law in Part II—for now, we 
simply notice the Court’s reaffirmation of Smith in the context of 
equality guarantees. 
Note here that the Court declined the invitation of advocates 
to distinguish between discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and discrimination on the basis of race. Conservatives 
had been urging judges to find that religious exemptions from 
laws protecting LGBTQ citizens were more acceptable than they 
were from laws protecting racial minorities. As others have 
explained more fully, the Court instead assimilated LGBTQ 
rights to the model of racial equality and to the paradigm of full 
and equal citizenship for everyone.11 Justice Kennedy 
prominently cited Piggie Park, the leading precedent for the 
proposition that a religious commitment to segregation cannot 
justify a free exercise exemption from a public accommodations 
law.12 That citation was important—it should permanently end the 
argument that the structural injustice experienced by LGBTQ 
customers is somehow less worthy of concern or more vulnerable 
to dissent than racial subordination. 
Second, Justice Kennedy recognized that the government’s 
interest in avoiding dignitary harm is sufficient to support the 
application of its antidiscrimination law, even without more 
tangible economic harm. Whether avoiding stigmatic harm was 
enough to justify application of the public accommodations law 
was at issue because Charlie Craig and David Mullins were able 
to find another wedding cake without significant economic loss.13 
 
applicable, then Smith and [Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993),] have failed as a means of protecting the free exercise of religion. In that 
event, Smith’s holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect against neutral and 
generally applicable laws should be reconsidered.”). 
 11. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination 
Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. F. 201, 204 (2018) (“Conservative advocates 
have long argued that courts and legislators should treat race and sexual orientation 
differently, denying religious exemptions from race nondiscrimination mandates but 
authorizing religious exemptions from sexual orientation nondiscrimination mandates . . . 
. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court rejects these arguments for expansive exemptions, 
instead assimilating sexual orientation into the antidiscrimination framework and 
affirming the importance of public accommodations laws.”). 
 12. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 
390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (calling “patently frivolous” the contention of a segregated 
restaurant that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “constitutes an interference with the free 
exercise of the [owner’s] religion”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. Robert Barnes, The spurned gay couple, the Colorado baker and the years spent 
waiting for the Supreme Court, DENVER POST (Aug. 14, 2017, 11:50 AM), 
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Yet Kennedy explained that invidious discrimination in the 
marketplace imposes a more profound harm than increased 
search costs. If equality laws were subject to unconstrained 
exceptions on grounds of religion or morality, he said, the result 
could be widespread refusals of service that would radiate 
“community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and 
dynamics of civil rights laws.”14 Frequent religious and moral 
exemptions to public accommodations laws would relegate 
vulnerable groups to a subordinate social status. 
Here too, advocates had been pushing the Court in the other 
direction. Lawyers and scholars had long argued that “dignitary” 
or “stigmatic” injury to same-sex couples should not count as 
harm at all, or at least not a harm that was sufficiently serious to 
override religious freedom.15 On this view, only feelings of self-
worth could be at stake, and LGBTQ citizens should be 
sufficiently resilient to resist such intangible injuries. Government 
should not work to shield citizens from “mere offense.” 
In Masterpiece, however, the Court rejected that view, holding 
that the systematic subordination of groups is an alarming and 
objective social wrong, not merely an injury to the feelings of the 
affected group. 
Finally, the majority overturned the lower court’s ruling for 
the couple because the Court found evidence that state officials 
had been infected by religious animus. Two members of the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission had made remarks that the 
Court took as evidence of hostility toward those who oppose 
marriage equality on religious grounds.16 Largely on the basis of 
 
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/08/14/colorado-gay-wedding-cake-case/ (“‘We did 
ultimately go to a different bakery,’ Mullins said.”). 
 14. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
 15. Brief for Petitioners at 52, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“an 
interest in avoiding some dignitary harms—though a real concern in certain 
circumstances—cannot override Phillips’s First Amendment freedoms and his own equally 
important dignitary interests”); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active 
Minority Groups: A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 376 (2016) 
(agreeing that “there is a dignitary harm in being refused service because of perceived 
immorality” but arguing that “[p]reventing these harms cannot be a compelling interest 
that justifies suppressing someone else’s individual rights”).  
 16. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30. 
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those comments, the Court ruled for the baker, finding that he 
had been the victim of antireligious “hostility.”17 
It is questionable whether Colorado’s commissioners acted 
out of hostility, as others have argued.18 Still, we are attracted to 
the legal premise upon which the Court’s ruling rests. Justice 
Kennedy drew on his opinion in Lukumi, where the Court struck 
down a local ordinance because it was gerrymandered to target a 
particular faith.19 The parts of Justice Kennedy’s Lukumi opinion 
that concerned legislative history failed to draw a majority.20 
Kennedy nevertheless succeeded in attracting a majority for that 
approach in Masterpiece, perhaps because of his argument that 
the dispute there concerned an adjudicative body, which carries a 
heavier burden of impartiality.21 
Setting aside the question of whether the distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative bias can be defended, Kennedy’s 
approach may be attractive. His earlier opinion in Lukumi rightly 
invoked Arlington Heights, an equal protection decision 
concerning racial discrimination.22 Under that approach, a 
plaintiff first must show that impermissible discrimination was “a 
motivating factor” by pointing to multiple circumstances. Then 
the government has an opportunity to show that it would have 
taken the same action even absent that bias.23 In Masterpiece, 
Justice Kennedy added force to this approach by ignoring the 
requirement of “but-for” causation. For Kennedy, a presumption 
of unconstitutionality attaches to any government action that is 
 
 17. Id. at 1730. For a trenchant analysis of the Court’s deployment of animus 
doctrine, see Melissa Murray, The New Minorities, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming). 
 18. Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 133, 138–43 (2018). 
 19. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). 
 20. Id. at 540–42 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 21. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (“Members of the [Lukumi] Court . . . disagreed 
on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into 
account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion. 
In this case, however, the remarks were made in a very different context—by an 
adjudicatory body deciding a particular case.”) (citation omitted). 
 22. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (plurality opinion) (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (setting out factors to be 
considered when determining a government purpose)). 
 23. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21 (“Proof that the decision by the Village 
was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have 
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted 
to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even 
had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”). 
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motivated by hostility toward a group that is vulnerable to 
subordination, even if that animus is mixed with legitimate 
motivations. The government still has an opportunity to rebut, but 
it must do more than demonstrate that it would have taken the 
same action even absent its bias. Instead, it must make the more 
difficult showing that its action is narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.24 That sensitivity to government 
hostility is probably a good thing—it suggests that close scrutiny 
should be applied to any government action that is motivated, 
even in part, by bias toward a group subject to structural injustice. 
Thus, the outcome in Masterpiece depended upon the 
proposition that the Constitution presumptively protects against 
any government decisionmaking that is causally influenced by 
hostility to religious dissenters, even if that hostility is not 
essential to the official action being challenged, an approach that 
was endorsed by the seven Justices in the majority and almost 
certainly congenial to Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor in 
dissent. Now the Court should extend that approach beyond 
religious cases, and make discriminatory motivation against 
subordinate groups presumptively unconstitutional. 
II. 
So Masterpiece promises several advances in the law 
governing conflicts between religious freedom and equality 
guarantees, not only for LGBTQ citizens, and not only in the law 
governing conflicts between religious freedom and equality 
guarantees, but in the broad constitutional project of protecting 
those vulnerable to structural injustice. However, the Court’s 
decision contains another element that may prove equally 
consequential but more deleterious to the guarantee of equal 
citizenship. In the course of his opinion, Justice Kennedy could be 
read to have suggested that the basic structure of civil rights law, 
as applied by Colorado officials, evinced hostility toward religion. 
 
 24. As others have noted, Justice Kennedy did not give the government an 
opportunity to show that its actions were necessary for the pursuit of a compelling interest. 
See Stephanie Barclay, The Supreme Court’s Cakeshop Ruling Is Not Narrow—And That’s 
A Good Thing, THE HILL (June 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/
391004-supreme-courts-cakeshop-ruling-is-not-narrow-and-thats-a-good-thing  (“[T]he 
government doesn’t even get a chance to argue that it had a sufficient justification for that 
type of religious discrimination. It is per se unconstitutional.”). Justice Kennedy’s failure 
to apply the compelling interest test was a mistake. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra 
note 18, at 152–53. 
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Whether Justice Kennedy intended to invite that conclusion or 
not, it has already been picked up and elaborated by academics 
and advocates, as we will explain.25 
To frame our discussion, it is necessary to clear away aspects 
of the decision that do not trouble us here. Recall first that the 
Masterpiece Court ruled for Jack Phillips, the baker, and against 
Charlie Craig and David Mullins, the couple celebrating their 
wedding, on the ground that state administrative officials made 
statements that displayed hostility toward religion.26 Although 
that reasoning was flawed,27 it was specific to the facts of 
Masterpiece and can be set aside. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority also criticized the 
way Colorado civil rights officials had turned away cases brought 
by someone named William Jack.28 In three separate situations, 
William Jack asked bakers to produce cakes that bore messages 
condemning marriage equality while referencing Christian 
scripture. When the bakers refused, William Jack sued them for 
discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of Colorado’s 
public accommodations law. Colorado civil rights officials turned 
away William Jack’s challenges, reasoning that he had been 
rejected not because he was religious, but because the bakers 
disagreed with his messages.29 Nothing in the state’s civil rights 
 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 41–46, 53–56. 
 26. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (reviewing statements by the commissioners and 
holding that “the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements [by the two 
commissioners] cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s 
adjudication of Phillips’ case”); id. at 1732 (concluding that the while the Commission 
could have weighed the state’s interest against Phillips’ without violating neutrality, the 
“official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments . . . 
were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires” and its “disparate 
consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the 
same”). 
 27. For persuasive critiques, see Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 18, at 138–45; 
Michael Dorf,  Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling Should (But Probably Won’t) Doom the 
Travel Ban, DORF ON LAW (June 4, 2018, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-should-but.html; Robert 
W. Tuttle & Ira C. Lupu, Masterpiece Cakeshop–A Troublesome Application Of Free 
Exercise Principles By A Court Determined To Avoid Hard Questions, TAKE CARE (June 
7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-a-troublesome-application-
of-free-exercise-principles-by-a-court-determined-to-avoid-hard-questions. 
 28. Will C. Holden, Castle Rock Man Whose “Anti-Gay” Cake Was Rejected: “I Was 
Discriminated Against,” FOX31 DENVER (Jan. 20, 2015, 5:23 PM), 
https://kdvr.com/2015/01/20/man-who-requested-anti-gay-cake-from-denver-baker-is-
castle-rock-educator/. 
 29. Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 25, 
2015), available at http://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U; Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge 
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law prohibited that, according to Colorado officials, and nothing 
about it suggested religious discrimination.30 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy nevertheless held 
that Colorado’s treatment of the bakery cases reflected hostility 
to religion. Here too, he highlighted express statements. For 
instance, the Colorado appellate court wrote in a footnote that 
civil rights officials had “found that the bakeries did not refuse 
[William Jack’s] request because of his creed, but rather because 
of the offensive nature of the requested message.”31 Kennedy 
found fault with this characterization, saying that the state court 
had improperly judged William Jack’s cakes to be “offensive.”32 
We think that Kennedy’s reading of the footnote was mistaken 
because the Colorado court was referring to the private bakers’ 
perception of William Jack’s messages as offensive, not that of the 
state.33 On this account, the worst that can be said of the state court 
is that its use of language was careless. But this aspect of the 
holding of the Masterpiece Court, like its concern with statements 
made by Colorado administrators, is case-specific and benign in 
its guidance. 
There was a more worrisome aspect of Justice Kennedy’s 
treatment of the William Jack cases, however. Kennedy saw 
Colorado’s divergent treatment of Williams Jack’s requests as 
reflecting hostility to religion, independent of the state court’s use 
of language. Kennedy identified two missteps by Colorado 
officials. First, state civil rights authorities concluded that any 
message conveyed by the wedding cake in Masterpiece would be 
attributed to Craig and Mullins, not the baker. But they did not 
consider whether William Jack’s messages would in like fashion 
be attributed to him rather than the bakers who declined to  
inscribe their cakes with them.34 A second misstep, for Kennedy, 
concerned the bakers’ willingness to serve other products to the 
 
No. P20140070X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015), available at 
http://perma.cc/35BW–9C2N; Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil 
Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/JN4U-NE6V.  
 30. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights. Com’n. 
Dec. 6, 2013),  available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/craig-and-mullins-v-
masterpiece-cakeshop-decision. 
 31. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015). 
 32. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 33. See Tuttle & Lupu, supra note 27 (criticizing the majority’s analysis of footnote 
eight); Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 18, at 144–45 (same). 
 34. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, , 
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730 (2018). 
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same customers. Colorado officials thought it relevant that the 
bakers who declined to sell William Jack his inscribed cakes 
would have sold him other cakes, including cakes bearing 
different religious messages; but they did not think it a matter of 
consequence that Phillips would have been willing to sell other 
goods to LGBTQ customers.35 For Justice Kennedy and the 
Court, these two analytic disparities suggested hostility to 
religion.36 
Justice Kennedy’s criticisms flowed from an oddly fine-
grained and unsympathetic reading of the behavior of Colorado’s 
officials. We are tempted to see them as make-weights, designed 
to allow Kennedy to avoid the ultimate force of Colorado’s 
commitment to equal citizenship by finding fault with its handling 
of these particular litigations. Whether that diagnosis is right or 
wrong, similar missteps can be avoided in future cases in Colorado 
and elsewhere. Officials can simply be more careful to justify their 
different treatment of different cases. 
So up to this point, the elements of state conduct upon which 
the Masterpiece Court relied were fact-specific, avoidable, and 
therefore harmless, except for these litigants. But Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court may be read as objecting to a 
different aspect of Colorado’s conduct that could not be as easily 
avoided. On this reading, the state was constitutionally entitled to 
protect gay and lesbian couples from wedding cake refusals only 
if it also protected customers who requested cakes inscribed with 
messages supporting traditional marriage. 
That would be both a misreading of the Court’s opinion and 
a constitutional mistake. But some language in Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion could be read to require the uniform treatment of these 
two sorts of cases.. At various points, he wrote: 
Another indication of hostility is the difference in treatment 
between Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers who 
objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and 
prevailed before the Commission.37 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1732 (concluding that “[t]he Commission’s disparate consideration of 
Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests [hostility to religion]”). 
 37. Id. at 1730. 
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[T]he Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious 
objection did not accord with its treatment of these other 
objections.38 
The Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case 
compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests [hostility to 
religion].39 
In context, it is clear that what Kennedy meant by “difference 
in treatment” was not the bottom line fact that the outcomes were 
different, but rather the divergence in how they were justified. He 
had in mind the two missteps we report above. We are confident 
of that reading, and reasonably confident that the opinion will 
come to be widely understood that way, especially since elsewhere 
Kennedy was at pains to say that Colorado could have offered 
reasons to justify divergent results in these cases.40 
Nevertheless, Kennedy stopped short of saying that those 
alternative rationales would be constitutionally sufficient. His 
omission will lead some to argue that state and local governments 
are constitutionally barred from treating the cases differently in 
any respect. That proposition is surely wrong, and it threatens civil 
rights enforcement. Though perhaps remote, the risk that it could 
be authoritatively attributed to the majority in Masterpiece is the 
most troubling aspect of the opinion. Interpretations by others 
have done little to reassure us. 
For instance, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote 
separately to insist that divergent treatment of the two bakery 
scenarios was justifiable. She and Breyer signed the majority 
opinion because they believed that Colorado had committed one 
or both of Kennedy’s missteps.41 (We side with the dissenters on 
this point.) But Justice Kagan went on to articulate a rationale 
that Colorado officials could have used to distinguish the cases: 
They might have simply relied on the fact that the bakers who 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1732. 
 40. At one point, Justice Kennedy clarified “that the State’s interest could have been 
weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite 
religious neutrality.” Id. at 1732. And at another, he allowed that “[t]here were, to be sure, 
responses to these arguments [regarding the comparison to the William Jack cases] that 
the State could make when it contended for a different result in seeking the enforcement 
of its generally applicable state regulations of businesses that serve the public.” Id. at 1728. 
 41. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The Court finds that the legal reasoning of 
the state agencies differed in significant ways as between the Jack cases and the Phillips 
case.”). 
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refused to provide William Jack’s cakes would have refused to 
create those cakes for any customer. Phillips, by contrast, refused 
to produce a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins that he happily 
would have baked for an opposite-sex couple.42 Justice Kagan’s 
distinction was deft, but without more it could be dismissed as 
facile. 
That seems to be the reaction of Douglas Laycock and 
Thomas Berg, prominent scholars of religious freedom.43 They 
concede that if Phillips did in fact refuse to sell the same sort of 
cake that he regularly made for opposite-sex couples—as he 
certainly did, according to the majority’s facts44—then “Kagan’s 
rationalization holds.”45 But, they say, “it is still a rationalization. 
Everyone would still know what is really going on: The 
commission agrees with the protected bakers and disagrees with 
Jack Phillips.”46 
It is this blunt insistence that hostility to religion would 
inevitably be signaled by a loss for the Masterpiece baker, despite 
a win for the other bakers, that puts us in mind of Charles Black’s 
seminal defense of Brown v. Board of Education. Against those 
who argued that the Court had taken sides in a policy debate 
among Americans without any basis in principle or law, Black 
made an “awkwardly simple” point: Segregation works to 
subordinate African-Americans, and racial subordination is 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.47 Relying on history 
and contemporary culture, he observed that the “social meaning” 
of segregation renders racial minorities unequal.48 Or again, “the 
social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a 
position of walled-off inferiority.”49 Though we are not the first to 
 
 42. Id. at 1733. 
 43. Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop—Not as Narrow as 
May First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/06/symposium-masterpiece-cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-first-appear/. 
 44. Justice Kennedy reported that Craig and Mullins, accompanied by Craig’s 
mother, entered Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested a wedding cake. Before they could 
describe the type of cake they wanted, they were told by Phillips that he did not make 
wedding cakes for same-sex couples. “The couple left the shop without further discussion.” 
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. In other words, Phillips refused to make them any kind of 
wedding cake. 
 45. Laycock & Berg, supra note 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Black, supra note 5, at 421. 
 48. Id. at 424. 
 49. Id. at 427. 
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appreciate the relevance of Black’s work for contemporary 
conflicts,50 we rely on him in a somewhat distinct way, 
emphasizing his methodological argument for a “reality 
principle” that allows and even requires courts to notice the social 
significance of government actions.51 
This is not a situation where “we ought to exercise one of the 
sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter,” as 
Charles Black urged.52 But with regard to “what is really going 
on,” Laycock and Berg have things backward.53 The logic of 
Colorado’s divergent treatment of the Jack Phillips and William 
Jack cases is simple, and it is innocent of any disagreement with 
or aversion to religion. Colorado—like many states—protects 
religious communities alongside other groups that are subject to 
structural injustice, including racial minorities, women, ethnic 
groups, and LGBTQ citizens.54 For a variety of reasons, Colorado 
does not protect persons who seek to broadcast controversial 
messages from being refused because of the specific content of 
those messages.55 If Jack Phillips—or any other baker—had 
declined to prepare a cake inscribed with words endorsing same 
sex marriage because of the content of the message alone, he 
would have violated no rule.56 So Colorado’s law is evenhanded 
 
 50. See, e.g., James M. Oleske, Jr., “State Action,” Equal Protection, and Religious 
Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (citing as the model for the 
Article’s title Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and 
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967)); Toni M. Massaro, The 
Lawfulness of the Same-Sex Marriage Decisions: Charles Black on Obergefell, 25 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 321 (2016). 
 51. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and 
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 90 (1967). 
 52. Black, supra note 5, at 424. 
 53. Laycock & Berg, supra note 43. 
 54. See State Public Accommodations Laws, National Conference of State 
Legislatures (July 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-
public-accommodation-laws.aspx (surveying the groups covered by state public 
accommodations laws). 
 55. See, e.g., Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. 
Mar. 25, 2015), http://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U. 
 56. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently came to a similar conclusion 
in Lee v. Ashers Baking Co., Ltd., [2018] UKSC 49. There, Mr. Lee requested a cake 
displaying an image of Bert and Ernie, the logo of QueerSpace, “an organization of the 
LGBT community” to which Mr. Lee belonged, and the words “Support Gay Marriage.” 
Ashers Baking Company refused to create the cake on religious grounds. Id. at paras. 10, 
12. The court ruled for the bakery on the ground that the company refused to provide the 
cake because of opposition to its message, not because of Mr. Lee’s identity, id. at para. 
22, and therefore it did not violate the Equality Act of 2006. The court rejected the 
argument that the sentiment “Support Gay Marriage” was so closely associated with 
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and symmetrical in its protection of religious believers and 
LGBTQ citizens against discrimination by merchants who decline 
to provide their goods or services to them on an equal and 
dignified basis, and Colorado’s law is evenhanded and 
symmetrical in permitting merchants to decline to inscribe their 
goods with messages with which they disagree, whether those 
messages are in favor or in opposition to marriage equality or any 
other subject matter. 
So what aspect of Colorado’s attempt to safeguard same-sex 
couples against discrimination could be understood to reflect bias 
against religion? One possibility was provided by the concurring 
opinion of Justices Gorsuch and Alito. They argued that Colorado 
unfairly treated Phillips’ refusal to provide a wedding cake to a 
same-sex couple as “tantamount” to exclusion on the basis of 
sexual orientation,57 on the one hand, while failing to treat refusals 
to produce William Jack’s cakes as tantamount to discrimination 
on the basis of religion, on the other.58 According to Gorsuch and 
Alito, that inconsistency violated the Constitution. “[J]ust as 
cakes celebrating same-sex weddings are (usually) requested by 
persons of a particular sexual orientation,” Justice Gorsuch wrote, 
“so too are cakes expressing religious opposition to same-sex 
weddings (usually) requested by persons of particular religious 
faiths.”59 Here we put to one side the matter of whether the 
 
LGBTQ status that rejecting it amounted to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. It noted that many people who are not LGBTQ support same-sex marriage. 
Id. at para. 25. As others have perceptively noted, it also matters that Mr. Lee was not 
requesting a wedding cake—he was planning to take the cake to a meeting of the 
QueerSpace organization. Dale Carpenter, U.K. Supreme Court: Baker Doesn’t Have to 
Place Pro-Gay Marriage Message on Cake, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 11, 2018, 5:30 
PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/11/uk-supreme-court-baker-doesnt-have-to-pl. 
(“On this view, Jack Phillips’ refusal to bake any cake at all for a gay wedding 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop is sexual orientation discrimination because it is closely linked to 
the sexual orientation of his customers. But the [owners’] refusal to ice the words ‘Support 
Gay Marriage’ in Lee is not sexual orientation discrimination because it is not much of a 
proxy for the sexual orientation of their customers.”). In other words, refusing to create 
any wedding cake for a marriage celebration between two men is closely associated with 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a manner that refusing to create a 
message supporting marriage equality is not. 
 57. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015) 
(“Masterpiece admits that its decision to refuse Craig’s and Mullins’ requested wedding 
cake was because of its opposition to same-sex marriage which, based on Supreme Court 
precedent, we conclude is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”) 
(citations omitted). 
 58. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719, at 1736–37 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. (“Either actual proof of intent to discriminate on the basis of membership in 
a protected class is required (as the Commission held in Mr. Jack’s case), or it is sufficient 
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history of cakes expressing opposition to marriage equality is long 
enough to characterize one way or another, taking the point at 
face value. 
At places in the concurrence, it seemed as if Gorsuch and 
Alito were drawn to the view that Phillips did not discriminate 
against gays and lesbians—he merely refused to be associated 
with same-sex weddings.60 But it would seem well within the 
prerogative of Colorado to determine whether excluding cakes 
for same-sex weddings counts as discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation for purposes of state law. On the best 
 
to ‘presume’ such intent from the knowing failure to serve someone in a protected class 
(as the Commission held in Mr. Phillips’s case). Perhaps the Commission could have 
chosen either course as an initial matter.”).  
  In the second round of litigation against Masterpiece, now pending in federal 
district court, the bakery makes something close to Gorsuch’s argument—illustrating its 
potential influence. There, Phillips turned away August Scardina, a transgender customer 
who requested a cake that was pink on the inside and blue on the outside in order to 
celebrate Scardina’s gender transition. Verified Complaint at paras. 6–7, 177–79, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074, 2018 WL 3870105 (D. Colo. Aug. 
14, 2018). After Colorado officials found probable cause that Phillips had discriminated on 
the basis of gender identity in violation of state public accommodations law, Phillips and 
the bakery sued them in federal court. In the Complaint, the Alliance Defending Freedom 
(ADF), which is continuing to represent Masterpiece and Phillips, details the facts of the 
William Jack cases. Id. at paras. 69–74. Next, ADF argues that Colorado violated the 
Constitution in the first Masterpiece litigation by treating Phillips’ objection to baking 
Craig and Mullins’s cake “worse” than it treated the other bakers’ objections to the 
William Jack cases.  Id. at para. 167. Specifically, and echoing Gorsuch without citing him, 
ADF contends that Colorado “presum[ed]” that Phillips’ refusal constituted 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while not “presuming” that the bakers 
who rejected William Jack’s cakes were discriminating on the basis of his faith. Id. at paras. 
212–13. And ADF invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece to support a rule 
against that kind of “unequal enforcement policy.” Id. at paras. 217-18. Finally, ADF 
concludes that Colorado is continuing to violate the Constitution by equating Phillips’ 
rejection of Scardina’s cake with discrimination on the basis of gender identity, even 
though it made no such “presum[ption]” in the William Jack cases, id. at paras. 212–21, 
and the Complaint seems to suggest that treating those cases differently is “blatantly and 
brazenly hostile toward religion,” id. at para. 285. This is not ADF’s only argument, but it 
is central to the litigation. 
 60. See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1737. For an explicit argument that 
discrimination on the basis of same-sex marriage does not necessarily amount to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars 
in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive Freedom in Support of Appellants, 
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 91615-2, 2016 WL 6126873, at *20 (Wash. Sept. 
30, 2016) (“[i]n  erroneously  conflating  Mrs.  Stutzman’s  religious  objection  to 
celebrating same-sex marriage with a refusal to serve customers ‘because of’ their  sexual  
orientation,  the  Superior  Court  extended  Washington’s antidiscrimination  law  beyond  
its  natural  scope  and meaning”). For an argument that sexual orientation identity is 
connected in complex ways to interpersonal relationships, including marriage, see Douglas 
NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the 
Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1197–99 (2012). 
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understanding, Gorsuch and Alito were arguing that Colorado 
was constitutionally required to treat William Jack as the victim 
of discrimination on the basis of religion if and because it treated 
Charlie Craig and David Mullins as victims of discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. 
In an ominous sign, Justices Gorsuch and Alito thought that 
view was consistent with Kennedy’s majority opinion, which they 
also signed. This is part of what makes us concerned that 
Kennedy’s opinion could be misread in the radical and misshapen 
way we are exploring. Perhaps Justices Gorsuch and Alito 
thought their argument resonated with the second misstep that 
Kennedy identified, namely that Colorado thought it relevant that 
the bakers would have refused to create William Jack’s cakes for 
any customers, but irrelevant that Phillips would have sold other 
products to Craig and Mullins.61 
In any event, Justices Gorsuch and Alito’s claim here is 
implausible—it flies in the face of the reality principle. To 
understand why, we need to realize that differences in treatment 
are occurring at two levels. At the first level, there are decisions 
by bakers to prepare wedding cakes under some circumstances 
and not others. Whether the bakers’ decisions are discriminatory 
is up to the state; it is a matter of Colorado law. At the second 
level, there is a state’s choice to outlaw some cake refusals while 
permitting others. Whether the state’s determinations are 
discriminatory is the question of federal constitutional law that 
the Court confronted. Yet we can only judge the appropriateness 
of the state’s selective behavior at the second level by 
understanding important features of the bakers’ selective refusals 
at the first level. 
Let us begin by considering the refusal of a baker to provide 
a cake for a gay wedding because he opposes same sex marriage. 
Gays and lesbians have long been the victims of structural 
injustice—or patterns of “disrespect and subordinat[ion],” to use 
Justice Kennedy’s language in Obergefell—that are enduring, 
pervasive, and tentacular.62 Legal, cultural, and religious bans on 
same sex marriage did not emerge as isolated judgments or 
discrete religious truths about marriage. Instead, they were 
integrated strands in a web of legally-endorsed social beliefs and 
 
 61. See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct.. at 1730.  
 62. Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
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practices in which LGBTQ conduct and identity were deplored 
and denounced. For gays and lesbians, that world of unequal 
regard is fresh and tenacious; it has not been swept away by a 
handful of court decisions. 
Same sex marriage is a site where structural injustice lingers. 
Marriage is for many the natural apotheosis of personal intimacy 
and union. In the lives of gays and lesbians—and only in their 
lives, with the rarest exceptions63—marriage is a union between 
two men or two women.  The Supreme Court’s recognition of a 
constitutional principle of marriage equality carries with it a 
profound social commitment to inclusion, to the repudiation of 
structural injustice. This was not left to our imaginations—the 
Obergefell Court made explicit the connection between marriage 
exclusion and “subordinat[ion]” of LGBTQ citizens: 
Especially against a long history of disapproval of their 
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to 
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of 
this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and 
subordinate them.64 
Refusals by vendors in the wedding industry to provision 
same sex weddings operate in the shadow of the history of 
structural injustice that the Court has so conspicuously set itself 
against. Necessarily, such refusals serve to exacerbate unequal 
citizenship. Courts have seen this, and they have repeatedly 
concluded that discrimination against people who wish to marry 
someone of the same sex constitutes discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.65 The Supreme Court was not breaking new 
 
 63. See Jim Oleske, Justice Gorsuch, Kippahs, and False Analogies in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (June 9, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/justice-gorsuch-
kippahs-and-false-analogies-in-masterpiece-cakeshop (“The Court has also taught that 
same-sex relations are inextricably tied to gay and lesbian people, and has thus ‘declined 
to distinguish between status and conduct’ in that context . . . . [T]he inherent connection 
between same-sex marriage and sexual-orientation is no less true just because there may 
be isolated incidents of straight people entering same-sex marriages.”). 
 64. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 65. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 
(2010) (“Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this 
context.”); Elane Photography v. Willock, LLC, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013) (“We agree 
that when a law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, that law 
similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation . . . . In this case, 
we see no basis for distinguishing between discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
discrimination based on someone’s conduct of publicly committing to a person of the same 
sex.”); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 553 (Wash. 2017) (“Stutzman argues 
that the [state public accommodations law] distinguishes between discrimination on the 
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ground when it rejected the status/conduct distinction in 
Obergefell. We know of no court that has taken the opposite 
view.66 
All nine justices in Masterpiece saw the link between same 
sex wedding goods and services and the subordination of LGBTQ 
citizens. The seven in the majority—joined implicitly on this point 
by dissenting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor—agreed that 
religious exemptions from public accommodations laws must be 
narrowly cabined or else “a long list of persons who provide goods 
and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for 
gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma 
inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws.”67 
That many such refusals would come from sincere religious 
believers would be a matter of regret, but it would not change the 
social consequences. 
Wedding vendors who turn their backs on same sex marriage 
on religious grounds have no evil in their hearts, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, but nevertheless they hold 
beliefs that coincide unhappily with the stratification that gays 
and lesbians have experienced. We are back to Charles Black and 
social structures. Vendors’ exclusion of same-sex spouses 
amounts to discrimination against gays and lesbians because it 
emerges from and contributes to their subordination. State and 
local governments have discretion to legislate against that form of 
refusal, insisting (as they often do) that it equates to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
In contrast, consider William Jack’s cases, where bakers 
refused to provide cakes that bore words condemning same sex 
marriage. Business owners refused to provide that service because 
they strongly supported marriage equality and they did not want 
to write words that explicitly contradicted that belief. Assume that 
William Jack was a member of a faith that opposed same sex 
 
basis of ‘sexual orientation’—which the statute prohibits—and discrimination against 
those who marry members of the same sex. But numerous courts—including our own—
have rejected this kind of status/conduct distinction in cases involving statutory and 
constitutional claims of discrimination . . . . In accordance with this precedent, we reject 
Stutzman’s proposed distinction between status and conduct fundamentally linked to that 
status.”) (citations omitted). 
 66. Scholars have tried to distinguish between status and conduct in the context of 
wedding vendors’ attempts to exclude same-sex couples, however. See Brief of Amici 
Legal Scholars, supra note 60. 
 67. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
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marriage on scriptural grounds, as he actually appeared to be.68 
When the state permitted bakers to refuse his requests, did it 
thereby render his faith vulnerable to the deep and pervasive 
patterns of “disrespect and subordinat[ion]” that we have called 
structural injustice? The answer, it seems clear, is simply no. 
Feelings around marriage equality run high, obviously, and it 
is possible to imagine in extreme cases that a neighbor or a 
customer or a friend will think less of a faith after learning that it 
opposes same-sex marriage. Perhaps disagreements of that sort 
could even lead to serious breaches in friendship or decisions to 
patronize another merchant. Conflicts of this sort are unfortunate 
and painful. But they are not the stuff of systematic and enduring 
disrespect and subordination; they do not resonate with structural 
injustice. 
The bakers who rejected William Jack’s cakes did so because 
of their messages, not because of his identity, commitments or 
beliefs. A baker who objected to same-sex marriage could 
similarly reject cakes that bore messages endorsing marriage 
equality.69 The state has powerful reasons not to tell merchants 
what words they must attach to their products.70 
Given all this, it is startling to hear that “[e]veryone . . . 
know[s] what is really going on” when Colorado requires Jack 
Phillips to treat same sex wedding celebrants the same as all of his 
other customers, but permits bakers of all sorts to decline to 
 
 68. See Holden, supra note 28 (describing William Jack as  “Christian educator” who 
was a founder of Worldview Academy, which was “dedicated to helping Christians think 
and live in accord with a Biblical worldview”). 
 69. Again, that was almost exactly the holding of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom in Lee v. Ashers Baking Co., Ltd., [2018] UKSC 49. There, the court declined to 
impose liability on a company that refused, on religious grounds, to create a cake bearing 
the words “Support Gay Marriage.” The court reasoned that “It is deeply humiliating, and 
an affront to human dignity, to deny someone a service because of that person’s race, 
gender, disability, sexual orientation or any of the other protected personal characteristics. 
But that is not what happened in this case and it does the project of equal treatment no 
favours to seek to extend it beyond its proper scope.” Id. at para. 35.  
 70. Cf. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands On 
Originals, Inc., No. 2015–CA–000745–MR, 2017 WL 2211381, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 
2017) (considering a case where a Christian business, Hands on Originals, refused to 
produce t-shirts celebrating a gay pride festival and holding that the public 
accommodations law was not violated because “[n]othing of record demonstrates [Hands 
on Originals] . . . refused any individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations it offered to everyone else because 
the individual in question had a specific sexual orientation or gender identity”) (emphasis 
omitted).  
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create messages that they find offensive.71 We are able to better 
understand this sense of the world if we appreciate that it is 
related to a different and deeper sense of injury. Religious 
objectors to same sex marriage suffered a serious loss when the 
Supreme Court held in Obergefell that same sex couples had a 
constitutional right to marry.72 The highest judicial authority on 
the meaning of the Constitution had ruled that what they 
regarded as vivid guiding truths were inconsistent with the 
demands of equal justice. The Supreme Court seemed to have left 
behind their deep and special concerns about the world. Nowhere 
was this more vibrantly represented than in the application of 
state and local public accommodation laws to marriage service 
providers. That dynamic made the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
hear Masterpiece an occasion of great importance to religious 
conservatives; it opened up an opportunity to constrain 
Obergefell, and to establish a right for believers to disregard some 
laws, despite Employment Division v. Smith. But, as we explained 
in Part I, the Masterpiece Court reaffirmed both Obergefell and 
the proposition that fervent religious commitment does not entitle 
objectors to exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. This aspect 
of Masterpiece undoubtedly disappointed religious dissenters, as 
it left standing state laws that require the equal treatment of same 
sex spouses, and imposed on them the personal cost of 
compliance. But that cost did not undermine the importance of 
ensuring equal citizenship status for all, nor did it call into 
question the constitutional status of laws that work to that end. 
CONCLUSION 
It may well be the case that some wedding vendors who 
oppose same sex marriage on religious grounds will feel ill-treated 
when required  to accept same sex couples as customers on equal 
terms with others. America’s constitutional commitment to the 
dismantlement of structural injustice has led civil rights law to 
require commercial enterprises to comply with antidiscrimination 
rules, even when those rules are inconsistent with the religious 
beliefs or cultural commitments of some owners. Everyone should 
acknowledge and respect the  commitments and identifications of 
religious citizens who object to marriage equality. We ourselves 
 
 71. Laycock & Berg, supra note 43. 
 72. Many nonreligious objectors to marriage equality suffered a similarly serious loss.  
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affirm believers’ claim to equal respect unequivocally. But the 
effort to limit marriage equality in Masterpiece has properly 
failed. That effort cannot be revived in the form of an argument 
that Charlie Craig and David Mullins must suffer discrimination 
simply because William Jack could find no bakers willing to create 
cakes bearing his messages. Any such suggestion runs headlong 
into the reality principle. 
Charles Black understood that there were feelings and values 
on both sides of the segregation debate.73 He also appreciated the 
view that there were constitutional interests on both sides 
(because segregationists enjoyed freedom of association), which 
he called the argument from “symmetry.”74 Finally, he saw that 
finding social meanings can be difficult because “there is no 
ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court, can 
permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else and to the 
Justices as individuals.”75 We acknowledge those complexities as 
well, as we must. They are genuine difficulties, but they should 
not obscure our perception of reality any more than they obscured 
his. 
Ultimately, Charles Black rejected the false equivalence of 
constitutional values that claimed to disable the declaration of 
racial justice in Brown. The Masterpiece Court is being read by 
some to gesture towards the proposition that a state can only 
protect a couple from being refused a wedding cake because they 
are both men if it also protects a person who wants to buy a cake 
inscribed with words denouncing same sex marriage. That 
equivalence is false as well, and it should be firmly rejected. 
 
 73. Black, supra note 51, at 100 (acknowledging the fear that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would come to regulate “the genuinely private concerns of man”). 
 74. Black, supra note 5, at 428. 
 75. Id. at 427. 
